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 Abstract 
The lack of transparency in the pricing and operational activities of state trading 
enterprises (STEs) has caused members of the World Trade Organization to express 
concern that certain countries’ STEs might circumvent Uruguay Round commitments on 
export subsidies, domestic support, or market access. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the market structure of the differentiated world malting barley market in which 
two STEs (the Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian Barley Board) maintain jointly 
a very large share of the export market. In particular, this study focuses on the exclusive 
procuring and pricing policies used by both STEs to test if these intra-country 
mechanisms can generate leadership and shift rent from other exporting countries. A 
conceptual and empirical framework is also provided to test if STEs set their initial 
payments at optimal levels. The study suggests that two STEs and other exporting 
countries were in Cournot competition. While some distortionary impacts from the STE 
prepayment systems are possible, it does not appear to be a tool that either STE employs. 
Empirical results from the precommitment stage show that the two STEs did not set their 
initial payments low enough to maximize their profits. 
 
Keywords: malting barley, market structure, prepayment system, product differentiation, 
rent shifting, state trading enterprises (STEs). 
 
  
 
 
STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES IN A DIFFERENTIATED 
 ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF GLOBAL MALTING  
BARLEY MARKETS 
As early as 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) acknowledged 
state trading enterprises (STEs) as legitimate participants in international trade. The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) defines STEs as “government and nongovernmental enterprises, 
including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privi-
leges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence 
through purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports” (see USDA 1997). 
Because STEs may be privately owned, the defining consideration is thus not governance 
but exclusive privileges. State trading is more prevalent in agriculture than in other eco-
nomic sectors. In 1995 and 1996, 32 countries notified the WTO of 96 agricultural 
enterprises or organizations operating as STEs. While STEs operate over a broad range of 
agricultural commodities, they are most active in grains and dairy products. 
Given the exclusive or special rights of STEs, the potential to exert considerable in-
fluence on the world markets is certainly possible. Controversial issues such as price-
pooling strategies and single-desk marketing functions of several large agricultural STEs 
(the Canadian Wheat Board [CWB]; the Australian Wheat Board [AWB], and the Austra-
lian Barley Board [ABB]) have been a major concern in the United States over the past 
decade (GAO 1995). In particular, questions have arisen as to whether the programs 
instituted by STEs could be tailored to circumvent the growing international commit-
ments toward freer trade. Certainly, these are valid concerns: nations for centuries have 
tried to protect and promote politically powerful industries. Indeed, the reported objec-
tives for operating STEs include protecting domestic markets from world market 
influence, maintaining a stable and adequate supply of key commodities for national 
defense purposes, and expanding and protecting export market shares (GAO 1995). 
Moreover, STEs oftentimes purposely operate under a shroud of government bureauc-
racy, which makes discerning their internal activities difficult.  
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The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted two investigative studies 
covering a wide range of STE behavioral, organizational, and strategic issues (GAO 
1995, 1996). Although STEs were found generally in compliance with WTO rules, some 
activities were considered potentially inconsistent with WTO law, such as export li-
censes, tax advantages, transportation subsidies, and delayed producer payments. The 
GAO study (1996) viewed the delayed payment system as a potential source of concern 
but primarily focused on its added flexibility in controlling internal budgets. Typically, 
the STEs pay upstream producers a below-market initial payment and then provide a 
lump-sum reimbursement after proceeds are generated in the downstream international 
markets. As a result, the prepayment approach is capable of creating a credible marginal 
cost advantage for the STEs in the international market and generating essentially the 
same rent-shifting effect as an export subsidy (Brander and Spencer 1985). In the case of 
STEs, Hamilton and Stiegert (2000) established the formal equivalence between the 
delayed producer payment system and these more familiar forms of precommitment. 
Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) empirically evaluated the rent-shifting hypothesis for a 
single STE operating in the international durum market. They found statistical support for 
the hypothesis that the CWB acted as a Stackelberg leader and derived its leadership role 
from its prepayment system.   
The purpose of the research in this study is to evaluate the prepayment system used 
by STEs operating in the international malting barley market. Because of the major 
differences that exist in the market for malting barley as compared to durum, it was 
necessary to extend and evolve this research in ways different from that of Hamilton and 
Stiegert (2002). Malting barley markets have historically operated with two STEs (ABB 
and CWB) both of which maintain a similar initial payment structure. Malting barley 
maintains a sensitive product quality structure, and much of what is planted for malting 
markets ends up as lower-priced feed barley. Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) assumed 
durum was homogeneous across export nations. Thus, a novel theoretical and empirical 
approach is developed to include a market structure for two STEs that properly accounts 
for product differentiation while testing for rent shifting.  
Much literature exists that examines STE trade impacts. First McCalla (1966) and then 
Alaouze, Watson, and Sturgess (1978) evaluated the international wheat market in terms of 
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its oligopolistic characteristics and keenly identified the role of STEs. Carter and Schmitz 
(1979) suggested that importer STEs had as much or more to do with the competitive 
structure in world wheat markets as did exporter STEs. While Carter (1993) found no 
evidence of imperfect competition in the international barley markets, Schmitz and Gray 
(2000) found that the CWB captured annually $72 million in noncompetitive rents. Kraft, 
Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz (1996) (in a study funded by the CWB) found that the CWB 
generated $19-$34/ton in benefits to farmers due to its single-selling authority system. 
Carter, Loyns, and Berwald (1998) (in a study funded by the Alberta Dept. of Agriculture) 
found completely the opposite result: that is, bureaucratic inefficiencies within the CWB 
generate $20-$37/ton in losses to Canadian farmers. Finally, general support for some form 
of STE leadership emerged from a variety of studies employing time-series analysis of 
international grain prices (Goodwin and Smith 1995; Smith, Goodwin, and Holt 1995; 
Spriggs, Kaylen, and Bessler 1982; and Goodwin and Schroeder 1991).    
Both the CWB and ABB have made strong claims of net public benefits emanating 
from its single-desk status. In its 1995-1996 annual report, for example, the CWB liter-
ally crowed about the findings of Kraft, Furtan, and Tyrchniewicz (1996, p. 6), claimed it 
had monopoly power (p. 5) and the ability to price discriminate (p. 6). The ABB claimed 
to have gained between $19 million and $41 million per year in demonstrable market 
premiums between 1985/86 and 1994/95 and that it could price discriminate among 
countries. The single desk of the ABB also had the potential to extract premiums and 
economic rents as a monopoly seller to domestic maltsters. Researchers at the Center for 
International Economics (CIE) (1997) examined the claims of the ABB and found no 
evidence of any price premiums in export markets for malting barley exported by the 
ABB. The CIE also pointed out that the claims of the ABB were overstated, because the 
ABB did not consider other effects, such as different qualities of barley and services and 
different sale and shipping times, in its analysis.  
Given the political sensitivity of STE activity and the subsequent debate in the aca-
demic literature, this study is motivated by the need for much greater understanding of 
STE activity in product differentiated, imperfectly competitive export markets. For 
internationally traded grains, attempts are usually made to standardize and/or grade and 
contract commodities to aid in transactions. There is, however, a fairly convincing and 
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growing literature that suggests a more differentiated market exists for most of these 
commodities (e.g., Stiegert and Blanc 1997; and Marsh 2003). In most cases, raw food 
commodities are differentiated by physical growing constraints, geographic origin, credit 
policies, delivery dates, and ancillary services.  
A key point from the seminal article by Brander and Spencer (1985) is that rent-
shifting is only possible when markets are imperfect and there exists some form of 
precommitment. Brander and Spencer demonstrated that this precommitment can occur 
when governments set a credible export subsidy in advance of the quantity decision by 
firms.1 However, the concept of Stackelberg leadership is most sensible in a situation 
when only one firm can precommit. If both governments could offer export subsidies, it 
is possible that both countries may be worse off as the result of a subsidy war and the 
rent-shifting outcome collapses to a classic prisoners’ dilemma (see Krugman 1989). 
With two STEs capable of precommitment, any rent shifted from other exporters would 
have to be shared, thus diminishing its incentive for use. The optimal strategic trade 
policy depends critically on details of the market (Eaton and Grossman 1986). Product 
differentiation creates other opportunities for market strategies that are not available 
when products are close substitutes (i.e., price discrimination, brand identity, etc.). The 
point here is that STEs have at their disposal a potential form of a precommitment 
mechanism. Exactly how that mechanism functions in a product-differentiated market is 
an interesting and important question to address.  
The organization of the remaining chapters is as follows. First, we provide some in-
formation on STEs in the international malting barley market. Then we develop both 
theoretical and empirical models and discuss data issues. Finally, we discuss the empiri-
cal results and summarize our findings.  
 
State Trading Enterprises in World Malting Barley Markets 
The CWB and the ABB are the two major STEs operating in the international export 
market for malting barley. The CWB is a single-desk state trading agency responsible for 
marketing all wheat and barley sold for human domestic consumption and for export, 
with jurisdiction over areas that typically produce 95 percent of the Canadian barley crop. 
One of the major responsibilities of the CWB is to market wheat and barley in order to 
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maximize returns to prairie producers. At the beginning of each crop year, the govern-
ment establishes initial producer payments for grain sold to the CWB. The initial 
payment is usually set low enough to avoid a deficit in the pool. Farmers get the initial 
payment upon delivery of the harvested crop. This acts as a price floor because the 
government will fund the pool should average market prices fall below the initial pay-
ment. Once the CWB has marketed all the grain in a particular pool, the revenue is 
pooled, and freight and handling charges are deducted. If returns to the pool exceed the 
sum of initial payments, then a final payment is distributed to each individual producer 
based on the relative producer share of grain in that particular pool.  
The practice of pooling makes the final price paid to producers a blended price based 
on net revenue of all sales in foreign and domestic markets. The STEs pay producers the 
same return regardless of the time of delivery during the marketing year.  
The ABB had the sole right to export barley grown in South Australia and Victoria, 
which produce over half of all barley grown in Australia. The ABB accounted for about 
90 percent of malting barley exports from Australia in 1992/93 (CIE 1997). The domestic 
market for malting barley is effectively controlled through the single-desk power of the 
ABB. One of the objectives of the ABB is to maximize the net returns to growers who 
deliver barley or other grain to a pool of the board. The ABB’s prepayment system and 
operations are similar to those of the CWB. In 1999, the ABB was privatized and 
changed to ABB Grain Ltd. Its single-desk export rights for barley from South Australia 
and Victoria were eliminated in July 2001.  
For marketing purposes, barley is classified into feed and malting varieties. Malting 
barley is simply high-quality barley that has the appropriate characteristics to produce 
good malt. The malting barley is further divided into two-row and six-row varieties, for 
which brewer demands differ. Breeding programs, agronomic practices, soil characteris-
tics, climatic conditions, and expected price differentials determine the varieties of barley 
grown in different regions. Farmers in Canada grow both two-row and six-row varieties 
of barley. Since 1991, plantings of six-row white varieties have increased because of 
contracts for the U.S. market. Australian barley producers almost exclusively plant two-
row varieties.  
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Conceptual Framework 
This section describes the derivation of a theoretical framework to examine firms’ 
behavior in a differentiated product market.  
Theoretical Model 
As discussed above, the delayed payment approach has the potential of creating a 
credible marginal cost advantage because STEs pay less to acquire exportable products 
and this has the same effect as an export subsidy. Moreover, in the case of STEs, the final 
payment in a delayed producer payment system, which is typically delivered in a lump-
sum fashion, provides an explicit method of transfer back to the input supplier that 
rationalizes the system. Therefore, the delayed producer payment structure is equivalent 
in this regard to a policy of direct export subsidization.  
The analysis in this study will be conducted on global malting barley markets. The 
malting barley market is considered to consist of imperfect substitutes. Agronomic 
practices, soil characteristics, and climatic conditions determine barley varieties grown in 
different regions, and downstream brewers have specific quality requirements in terms of 
acceptable varieties, protein, plumpness, and germination. Trade practices such as credit 
terms, delivery dates, and ancillary services add to the overall product differentiation. 
Finally, consumer preferences vary by region, personal taste, and suppliers and lead to a 
derived demand for various sets of malt characteristics.  
We begin with a theoretical model that proposes endogenous control of an upstream 
supply in that STEs choose the initial prices of their principal raw commodity and then 
compete in an international market of imperfect substitutes. We presume throughout that 
STEs and producers are vertically aligned and that the government grants the STE 
exclusive purchase rights of the raw commodity. The vertical structure analyzed here 
consists of two stages solved by backward induction. In the first stage (precommitment 
stage), both STEs simultaneously choose their initial payments for the material input. In 
this stage, we employ a subset of the output-stage results to characterize the value of the 
trade policy parameter associated with the optimal degree of rent shifting, which is 
consistent with the assumption that the government sets a subsidy level with the under-
standing of how it influences the output equilibrium. The second stage is an output stage, 
in which the STEs and other exporting firms maximize profits by choosing quantities and 
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maintain the ability to either store nonoptimal supplies or downgrade the quality of 
nonoptimal supplies for sale to a residual feed barley market. We estimate the output 
stage by considering STE trade policy as a given shift parameter in the domestic marginal 
cost function.  
Let x1, x2, and x3 represent total sales of malting barley to the world market by the 
CWB (1), ABB (2), and the other malting barley exporting countries (3), respectively, 
and denote the downstream inverse demand functions of malting barley marketed by the 
CWB, the ABB, and other exporting countries as P1, P2, and P3, respectively. The 
country-specific inverse demand functions of malting barley are as follows: 
 1 1 1 2 3 1( , , ; )            P P x x x= Φ   (1) 
 2 2 1 2 3 2( , , ; )            P P x x x= Φ  (2) 
 3 3 1 2 3 3( , , ; )            P P x x x= Φ   (3) 
where Φi are exogenous variables. If barley varieties were perfect substitutes or homoge-
neous, all the prices would be equal, net of transport costs. Obviously, if barley varieties 
were imperfect substitutes, each demand change would generate a different impact on 
each price.  
In the output stage, the STEs and the firms in other exporting countries choose their 
outputs to maximize profits by 
 
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( )xMax x Px w xπ = −                    (4) 
 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 ( )xMax x P x w xπ = −                  (5) 
 3 3 3 ( )qMax q P q c qπ = −                        (6) 
where w1 and w2 are initial payments set in the precommitment stage by the CWB and the 
ABB, respectively; and c3 is the price received by farmers of other exporting countries. 
Here, we assume that there are n symmetric firms in the other exporting countries and 
thus q=(1/n)x3. In this study, we choose outputs as strategic variables because the STEs 
and other exporting firms have the ability to either store nonoptimal supplies or down-
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grade the quality of nonoptimal supplies for sale to a residual market or feed barley 
market and could subsequently maximize profits by choosing quantities.  
Maximization of equations (4), (5), and (6) with respect to x1, x2, and q, respectively, 
yield the first-order conditions:  
 1 1 11 12 12 13 13 1( ) 0P x P P P wγ γ+ + + − =   (7) 
 2 2 21 21 22 23 23 2( ) 0P x P P P wγ γ+ + + − =  (8) 
 3 3 31 31 32 32 33 3( ) 0P x P P P cγ γ+ + + − =   (9) 
where Pij=∂Pi/∂xj ≤ 0 and γij =∂xj/∂xi. The γij (i, j=1, 2, 3, and i≠j) indicates firm j’s 
reaction or best response to the change of firm i’s quantity. For example, γ12 indicates the 
ABB’s reaction/best response to the output change of the CWB. The reactions of firms to 
other firms’ output changes provide an index of the degree of market power, consistent 
with behavior from price-taking to perfect collusion, by leading directly to the relevant 
first-order conditions for the various models.  
When products are imperfect substitutes, the conditions for various market models 
are different from those under a homogeneous product scenario. In particular, each of the 
best-response parameters (the γij’s) is weighted by the unique cross-price impacts (Pij’s) 
that can limit or exasperate the degree of market power. For example, for the CWB, if the 
term in the parentheses in equation (7) is equal to zero (i.e., if P11+γ12P12+γ13P13 =0), then 
the CWB is a price taker. However, when market power is present and as products 
become more differentiated, cross-price effects dissipate and the own-price effect takes 
on more relative weight. For the homogeneous case with market power, each of the best-
response parameters are equally weighted by the aggregate price effect (∂Pi/∂xj), which 
can be easily reinterpreted as a market demand elasticity.  
Let xi(w1, w2; Ψi) represent the equilibrium levels of sales from country i in the out-
put stage, given initial payments of w1 and w2. In the precommitment stage, the STEs 
select transfer prices, w1 and w2, so as to 
 1
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 2 1
1 1 2 1 1
 ( ( , ; ), ( , ; ), ( , ; )) ( , ; )
( , ; )
pw
c
Max P x w w x w w x w w x w w
c x w w F
π ψ ψ ψ ψ
ψ
=
− −      (10) 
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 2
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 1 2 2
2 1 2 2 2
 ( ( , ; ), ( , ; ), ( , ; )) ( , ; )
( , ; )
pw
a
Max P x w w x w w x w w x w w
c x w w F
π ψ ψ ψ ψ
ψ
=
− −   (11) 
where π1p and π2p are the profit of producers under the CWB and the ABB, respectively. 
The variables cc and ca are the marginal production costs for producers in Canada and 
Australia, respectively. For simplification of the problem, production costs are assumed 
to be constant. The Ψi are exogenous variables affecting supplies. Variables F1 and F2 are 
fixed costs that could include, respectively, marketing and administration costs incurred 
by the CWB and the ABB.  
Optimal Initial Payments 
Let the wi*’s denote the optimal initial payments. The first-order conditions of equa-
tions (10) and (11) are 
 31 1 1 1 2 1 11 1
1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1
( ) 0c
xx P x P x P xP x c
w x w x w x w w
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + + − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (12) 
 32 2 1 2 2 2 22 2
2 1 2 2 2 3 2 2
( ) 0.a
xx P x P x P xP x c
w x w x w x w w
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ + + − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (13) 
Using backward induction from (7) and (8) and substituting Pi+xiPii = wi-xi(γijPij+ γikPik) 
(i,j=1,2, i≠ j; k=3) into (12) and (13), the optimal upstream prices set by the STEs are 
 
2 3
* 1 1
1 1 12 12 13 13
1 1
1 1
[ ( ) ( )]c
x x
w ww c x P Px x
w w
∂ ∂
∂ ∂− = − − + −∂ ∂
∂ ∂
γ γ  (14)  
 
31
* 2 2
2 2 21 21 23 23
2 2
2 2
[ ( ) ( )]a
xx
w ww c x P Px x
w w
γ γ
∂∂
∂ ∂− = − − + −∂ ∂
∂ ∂
                      (15)     
    
where ∂xi/∂wj (i=1, 2, or 3; and j=1 or 2) may be derived by taking total differential of 
equations (7), (8), and (9). The ratios of marginal effects in (14) and (15) can be expressed as 
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2
6 7 4 9 6 7 4 91
1 5 9 6 8 5 9 6 8
1
( ) / | |
( ) / | |
x
S S S S S S S S Sw
x S S S S S S S S S
w
∂
− −∂ = =∂ − −
∂
 
3
4 8 5 7 4 8 5 71
1 5 9 6 8 5 9 6 8
1
( ) / | |
( ) / | |
x
S S S S S S S S Sw
x S S S S S S S S S
w
∂
− −∂ = =∂ − −
∂
 
1
3 8 2 9 3 8 2 92
2 1 9 3 7 1 9 3 7
2
( ) / | |
( ) / | |
x
S S S S S S S S Sw
x S S S S S S S S S
w
∂
− −∂ = =∂ − −
∂
 
3
2 7 1 8 2 7 1 82
2 1 9 3 7 1 9 3 7
2
( ) / | |
( ) / | |
x
S S S S S S S S Sw
x S S S S S S S S S
w
∂
− −∂ = =∂ − −
∂
 
 In the above equations, the Si’s are the submatrices in the matrix S defined as 
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
S S S
S S S S
S S S
  =    
 
11 12 12 13 13 1 111 12 121 13 131 12 1 112 12 122 13 132 13 1 113 12 123 13 133
21 2 21 211 221 23 231 22 21 21 23 23 2 21 212 222 23 232 23 2 21 213 223 23 2
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 2 ( ) ( ) (
P P P x P P P P x P P P P x P P P
P x P P P P P P x P P P P x P P P=
+ + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + +
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ 33
31 3 31 311 32 321 331 32 3 31 312 32 322 332 33 31 31 32 32 3 31 313 32 323 333
)
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )P x P P P P x P P P P P P x P P P+ + + + + + + + + + +
    γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
                     
with the notation that Pijk=∂2Pi/∂xj∂xk (i, j, k=1, 2, 3, respectively).  
In equations (7), (8), and (9), the value of the γij’s combined with the cross-price ef-
fects gives an illustration of the market structure and the degree of competition. 
Specifically, the departure of the γij’s from zero is a logically consistent test of whether 
the Cournot-Nash model provides an accurate description of the industry equilibrium.  
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Rent Shifting 
“Rent shifting” is a theoretical concept implying that governments can employ trade 
policy as a pre-commitment device to transfer profits from foreign to domestic markets. 
To test the hypothesis that the CWB and the ABB strategically utilize their pre-payment 
systems and product differentiation to shift rents from other foreign firms, the following 
formulas can be calculated:   
 
3
1
i i k
kj k j
i k
x
w x w
π π
=≠
∂ ∂ ∂=∂ ∂ ∂∑ . (16) 
The expressions ∂xk/∂wj has been defined earlier and ∂πi/∂xk can be derived from equa-
tions (4), (5), and (6) by taking derivatives. If ∂π1/∂w1<0 and ∂πi/∂w1>0 (i= 2, or 3), then 
by lowering its initial payments, the CWB could increase its profit and decrease firm i’s 
profits. In this case, the CWB strategically utilizes its pre-payment system to shift rents 
from country i. Similar analysis could be applied to the ABB. Unlike in the homogeneous 
product market, rent shifting in the product-differentiated market depends not only on the 
market structure but also on cross-price effects, which indicate the degree of product 
differentiation.  
 
Empirical Methods 
In this section, an empirical methodology will be discussed to conduct empirically an 
examination and evaluation of what has been developed in the previous section.  
Model Specification 
To evaluate the degree of market power, it is necessary to identify γij’s. Equations 
(7), (8), and (9) are expanded and rearranged as 
 1 1 12 12 1 13 13 1 11 1( ) ( )t t t t tP w P x P x P x− = + −λ λ   (17) 
 2 2 21 21 2 23 23 2 22 2( ) ( )t t t t tP w P x P x P x− = + −λ λ   (18) 
 3 3 31 31 3 32 32 3 33 3( ) ( )t t t t tP c P x P x P x− = + −λ λ  (19) 
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The market power parameters in the above equations (λij’s) are the negative counterparts 
of the response parameters in (7), (8), and (9). That is, γij =-λij. To estimate the parameters 
(λij’s) in this system, we must have estimates of the derivatives of prices with respect to 
quantities, which are P12, P13, P21, P23, P31, and P32. In this manner, we empirically allow 
for some degree of product heterogeneity (i.e., imperfect substitutes).  
To identify the quantity derivatives of prices, an input distance function is specified for 
malt production and inverse demand equations are derived. From the inverse demand 
equations, the derivatives of prices with respect to quantities can be identified directly. The 
aggregate input distance function of malting barley by importing countries is defined as  
 
d
( , ) max{d| F( / d) Y}D D Q Y Q= = ≥  (20) 
where Q is an (n×1) vector of input quantities; Y is a (1×1) scalar representing malt 
output; and F(Q/d) is the production technology. The behavioral assumption is to rescale 
all the input levels that are consistent with a target output level. Specifically, d is the 
largest scalar value that could be used to divide Q and still produce Y. The distance 
function is assumed to be weakly separable in inputs by partitioning inputs into two 
subgroups of raw grain input and other inputs.  
To complete the model specification, the distance function is assumed to take the 
form of a normalized quadratic distance function (Marsh and Featherstone 2003; Holt and 
Bishop 2002). The normalized quadratic distance function is a flexible functional form 
and is given by 
 
2 2 2 2
* * * * * * 2
0 i i ij i j 3 iY i Y
1 1 1 1
1 1( , ) ( )
2 2i i j i
d Q Y b b x b x x b Y b x Y b Y
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑∑ ∑  (21) 
where d* and xi* are normalized distance and input quantities, d*=D/x3, and xi*=xi/x3, 
respectively. The normalized quadratic distance function is linear homogeneous, concave, 
nondecreasing in inputs, and nonincreasing in output. The inverse demand functions for 
CWB and ABB are obtained using Gorman’s Lemma:  
 * * *1 1 11 1 12 2 1YP b b x b x b Y= + + +  (22) 
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 * * *2 2 22 2 12 1 2YP b b x b x b Y= + + +  (23) 
where Pi* is normalized input prices by cost 
3*
1/ .i i j jjP P P x== ∑  Consequently, the cost 
of producing the target level of output is unity. The third inverse demand function for 
other exporting countries is dropped to avoid singularity of the error covariance matrix. 
The derived inverse demand function is homogeneous of degree zero in inputs. Homoge-
neity is realized by the normalization process and symmetry is imposed by setting bij=bji. 
Coefficients for the inverse demand response for other exporting countries are recovered 
using standard demand restrictions.  
The derivatives of prices with respect to quantities (∂Pi/∂xj) could be expressed by 
normalized input quantities and parameters in (22) and (23). Then, equations (17), (18), 
and (19) could be expressed as follows: 
 * * * * *1 1 12 12 13 11 1 13 12 2 11 1( )P w b b x b x b xλ λ λ− = − − −  (24) 
 * * * * *2 2 21 12 23 12 1 23 22 2 22 2( )P w b b x b x b xλ λ λ− = − − −  (25) 
 
* * * *
3 3 31 11 1 12 2
* * * * * * * *
32 12 1 22 2 11 1 12 2 1 12 1 22 2 2
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
P c b x b x
b x b x b x b x x b x b x x
λ
λ
− = − +
− + − + − +   (26) 
where wi* are the normalized initial payments by cost (see the Appendix for derivation). 
In all, the empirical model consists of a system of five equations: two inverse demand 
equations [(22) and (23)] and three equations for estimating market power parameters 
[(24), (25), and (26)].  
 
Data 
International statistics, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization Yearbook and 
World Grain Statistics, report barley trade aggregately instead of separating it into feed 
and malting barley. Consistent data for malting barley export quantities and prices were 
available only for Canada and Australia. Multiple data sources include but are not limited 
to the CWB annual report (various), the ABB annual report (various), ABARE’s Austra-
lian Commodity Statistics (various), CIE 1997, Schmitz and Koo 1996, USDA 1997, and 
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Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada’s Bi-weekly Bulletin (various). Considering data 
availability and status change of the ABB, the data range is set between 1975/76 and 
1997/98. A thorough description of the procedures for obtaining and developing data for 
the study may be obtained from the authors.  
 
Estimation Results and Discussion 
The empirical analyses were carried out using both a Bayesian inference framework 
with restrictions (e.g., Geweke 1986) and a generalized likelihood framework (Gasmi, 
Laffont, and Vuong 1992). The Bayesian framework allowed parametric restrictions on 
the λij’s and other parameters, as well as imposition of general demand conditions. 
Moreover, it was a convenient framework from which to obtain bootstrapped confidence 
intervals for levels of initial payments defined in (14) and (15) and rent shifting defined 
in (16). Alternatively, the generalized likelihood framework enabled us to set up several 
different market structures and draw inferences from nonnested hypothesis tests. In 
addition to testing alternative market structures, the generalized likelihood results pro-
vided a comparison to the Bayesian results. 
Bayesian Approach  
In this study, the Bayesian approach is applied because of its advantage in drawing 
finite sample inferences concerning nonlinear functions of parameters and imposing 
economic restrictions. Let L( , | , )Y X β Σ  be the likelihood function summarizing all the 
sample information. Then, applying Bayes’ theorem, the posterior distribution becomes 
 ( , | , )  L( , | , ) ( , )f Y X Y X pβ β βΣ ∝ Σ Σ  (27) 
where ∝  means “is proportional to.” In (27), β is a vector of model parameters, Σ de-
notes the covariance matrix, and Y, X represent data observations. The posterior joint 
density function is ( , | , )f Y Xβ Σ  for β and Σ, given observed random variables Y and X, 
or revised beliefs about the distribution of β and Σ after observing the data. The prior 
density function ( , )p β Σ  summarizes the nonsample information about β and Σ.  
Following Judge et al. (1985, pp. 478-80), and assuming a multivariate normal, the 
likelihood function compatible with the seemingly unrelated regression model is given by 
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 / 2 1( , | , )  | | exp[ 0.5 ( * )]NL Y X tr Rβ − −Σ ∝ Σ − Σ  (28) 
where tr denotes the trace operator, which is the sum of the diagonals of a square matrix; 
R is a symmetric estimated covariance matrix; and N is the number of observations. A 
noninformative or diffuse prior is used for β and Σ: 
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )sp p p I hβ β βΣ = Σ ∈     s=1,2 (29) 
where ( )p β ∝  constant and ( 1) / 2( ) | | Ip − +Σ ∝ Σ  is in the form of a Wishart distribution. In 
(29), hs is the set of permissible parameter values when constraint information is (s=2) 
and is not (s=1) available. The I( . ) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the 
argument is true (Griffiths, O’Donnell, and Cruz 2000). The posterior density under the 
noninformative prior is  
 ( 1) / 2 1( , | , )  [ | |] exp[ 0.5 ( * )] ( )       s=1, 2.N I sf Y X tr R I hβ β− + + −Σ ∝ Σ − Σ ∈   (30) 
Techniques of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation estimation (i.e., the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm) are applied to carry out the Bayesian estimation. The 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm can draw samples from a marginal probability density 
indirectly without having to derive the density itself. The algorithm allows the imposition 
of curvature, monotonicity, and bounds on market power parameters during the sample 
drawing process. It imposes curvature restrictions locally with computational advantages 
over importance sampling (Chib and Greenberg 1996). 
The empirical model linked to the theory consists of a system of five equations: two 
inverse demand equations (22) and (23); and three equations for estimating market power 
parameters (24), (25), and (26). The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm on this system of 
equations is carried out in several steps:  
Step 1: Specify an arbitrary starting value β0 that satisfies the constraints of curva-
ture, monotonicity, and bounds on market power parameters (and set iteration i=0)  
Step 2: Given the current value βi, use a symmetric transition density q(βi, βc) to 
generate a value as the next candidate in the sequence.  
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Step 3: Use the candidate value βc to evaluate the curvature, monotonicity, and 
bounds on market power parameters constraints. If any constraints are violated, then 
reject βc.  
Step 4: Let u(βi, βc)=min(g(βc)/g(βi), 1), where g(β) is the kernel of the marginal 
density f(β|Y, X) obtained by integrating Σ out of the posterior function (Judge et al.): 
/ 2
2( | , )  | | ( ) ( )
Nf Y X R I h gβ β β−∝ ∈ = .  
Step 5: Generate an independent uniform random variable U from the interval [0,1].  
Step 6: Let βi+1 =β c if U< u(βi, βc) or  βi+1 =β i if U ≥ u(βi, βc). Set i=i+1 and return 
to step 2. 
Additional assumptions and parameters are needed to specify completely the MCMC 
process. Chib and Greenberg (1996) provide a complete theoretical overview, while 
Griffiths, O’Donnell, and Cruz (2000) provide details specific to the estimation of the 
linear seemingly unrelated regression model with MCMC. The burn-in period for the 
empirical applications was set at 300,000 iterations, which was sufficient to ensure the 
elimination of the starting value influence and the convergence of the MCMC chain to a 
stationary distribution.2 The post burn-in sample size m was set to 300,000 iterations. The 
iteration process generates a chain with the property that for large i βi+1is an effective 
sample from the posterior joint density. Consequently, the sequence βi+1, …, βi+m can be 
regarded as a sample from f(β|Y, X) that satisfies the constraints of curvature, montonic-
ity, and bounds on market power parameters. In step 3, the concavity constraint is 
evaluated by using the maximum eigenvalue of the estimated Hessian matrix. Starting 
values were chosen that satisfied economic constraints. The choice of transition density 
q(βi, βc) is arbitrary, but it is commonplace to use a multivariate normal distribution (with 
mean βi and covariance matrix from the unrestricted nonlinear seemingly unrelated 
regression estimator). In order to manipulate the rate at which the candidate βc is ac-
cepted as the next value in the sequence, a tuning constant was used to multiply the 
covariance matrix. Based on trial and error, the tuning constant is set at 0.01 to make the 
acceptance rate of approximately 0.50.      
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Parameter Estimates 
Confidence intervals for parameter estimates are constructed after the burn-in period. 
The 90 percent confidence interval for each parameter was constructed by the percentile 
method, which requires ranking the estimated parameters and then selecting the 15,000th (5 
percent of total iterations) outcome as the lower critical value and the 285,000th (95 
percent of total iterations) outcome as the upper critical value. If the confidence interval for 
a parameter estimate contains zero, then the parameter value is not considered significant 
from zero at the 10 percent level. The parameter estimates, along with the upper and lower 
bounds of the 90 percent confidence intervals for the Bayesian system, are reported in 
Table 1. Both b11 and b22 are significant at the 10 percent level and negative because of the 
curvature constraint set during the estimation process. Both output parameters (b1y and b2y)  
TABLE 1. Estimations by Bayesian approach 
  90% Confidence Interval 
 Estimations Upper Critical Value Lower Critical Value
b1 0.004569 0.006110 0.002872 
b2 0.000981 0.002502 -0.000444 
b11 -0.000314 -0.000148 -0.000468 
b12 0.000032 0.000105 -0.000036 
b22 -0.000077 -0.000010 -0.000149 
b1y -0.000220 -0.000120 -0.000309 
b2y -0.000040 0.000050 -0.000130 
λ12 -0.010489 0.892883 -0.903652 
λ13 -0.003419 0.908939 -0.890538 
λ21 -0.009258 0.898162 -0.899115 
λ23 -0.001981 0.899945 -0.902355 
λ31 0.008496 0.900737 -0.897575 
λ32 0.011256 0.900635 -0.895491 
Note: Burn-in period=300,000. Sample size=300,000. 
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are negative and only b1y is significant. This shows that output of malt has a significant 
effect on the price of malting barley from the CWB and has a insignificant effect on the 
price of malting barley from the ABB. However, the significant effect is very small. Cross-
effect parameter b12 is insignificant, which suggests that the substitution effects among 
malting barley from different origins are not significant. Besides product differentiation, 
one possibility for disguising substitution effects is the effect of geographic distance. 
Market power parameters (λij) are constrained to lie between -1 and 1. Significance or 
insignificance of response parameters describes the conduct of STEs and firms in the world 
malting barley market. If the market power parameter λij is not significant, then country i 
does not consider country j’s output change when i makes its decision. If both λij and λji are 
not significant, then the two countries are in Cournot competition. The results show that all 
market power parameters are not significant, which suggests that the CWB, the ABB, and 
the other exporting countries are in Cournot competition with each other.  
Initial Payment 
Using equations (14) and (15), we tested the two STEs to see if they had set their ini-
tial payments at optimal levels. With linear inverse demand functions, all second 
derivatives of prices with respect to quantities are zero, which greatly simplifies the 
matrix S. By testing the null hypothesis that the optimal markdowns (right-hand sides of 
equations [14] and [15]) were equal to the true values of the markdowns, wi-ci, which is 
the same as testing H0: wi*-wi=0, it could be determined statistically whether the CWB 
and the ABB set their initial payments at optimal levels. Table 2 contains the boot-
strapped estimates of the differences between optimal initial payments and actual 
payments, along with the upper and lower bounds of the 90 percent confidence interval  
 
TABLE 2. Estimates for hypothesis test H0: wi*-wi=0 by Bayesian method 
 Mean 90% Confidence Interval 
 ($/1,000 tonnes) Upper Critical Value Lower Critical Value 
w1*-w1 698.333727 279.425133 1173.773703 
w2*-w2 854.334639 697.353257 1101.998755 
 
 
State Trading Enterprises in a Differentiated Environment / 19 
  
for the Bayesian system. Both the CWB and the ABB set their initial payments consid-
erably higher than optimal levels. This implies that while some rent shifting was possible, 
there is not much support for the conclusion that the prepayment system is operating as 
an effective strategic tool.   
Rent Shifting 
A null hypothesis test that STEs could shift rents from other exporting countries, 
which was based on equation (16), was also conducted by the bootstrap method. Table 3 
shows the test results of rent shifting. All values are insignificant. Therefore the hypothe-
sis that STEs could not utilize their initial payments to shift rent cannot be rejected. 
Combined with the earlier bootstrapped results, a fairly strong conclusion emerges. It 
does not appear that the prepayment system can be used to shift rent, and, even if it could, 
it is currently being strictly underutilized.  
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
To see if the findings from the bootstrap procedures hold up to additional testing, a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test was conducted. With 23 pairs of observations of the ranked 
data, the Wilcoxon signed rank statistic was -4.19726, which has an absolute value 
greater than the critical value at the 5 percent level for standard normal distribution for 
both the CWB and the ABB. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there were no differences 
between optimal and observed initial payments ( H0: wi*-wi=0) should be rejected. 
Consequently, the left-tail alternative, which observed that initial payments were higher 
than optimal levels (H1: wi*-wi<0), could be accepted. Therefore, the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test suggests that both STEs set their initial payments at higher-than-optimal levels.  
 
TABLE 3. Hypothesis test that STEs could shift rents from other exporting countries 
by Bayesian method 
  90% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Upper Critical Value Lower Critical Value 
∂π2/∂w1 -36.456899 143.316877 -302.079605 
∂π3/∂w1 -182.203001 293.554632 -839.634976 
∂π1/∂w2 -414.891691 608.167068 -1044.391131 
∂π3/∂w2 -752.743429 2094.303887 -2564.479655 
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Generalized Likelihood Tests 
Following Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1992), we set up several plausible market 
structures and evaluated them using a normalized likelihood ratio (LR) test for nonnested 
models. The test is based on the generalized LR principle and is designed to test the null 
hypothesis that two competing models adjust the data equally well versus the alternative 
hypothesis that one model fits better. Four market structures were imposed:  
Model 1: CWB Lead / ABB follow / other exporting countries follow.  
Model 2: ABB Lead / CWB follow / other exporting countries follow.  
Model 3: ABB and CWB jointly lead / other exporting countries follow.  
Model 4: ABB, CWB, and other exporting countries are in Cournot equilibrium.  
For each pair of models (Mf, Mg) (f, g =1, 2, 3, or 4; and f≠g), we calculated the likeli-
hood ratio statistic normalized by 
 
1
1 2
1 1 22
1
1ˆ ( )
2
N
n ft f ft gt g gt
t
N r − −
=
 ′ ′= Σ − Σ  ∑ µ µ µ µ  
where µs and Σs are the estimated residuals and covariance matrix for model Ms, s=f, g. 
To take into account the difference in the number of estimated parameters in the models, 
we adjusted the LR statistic using penalties, proposed by Schwarz (1978), which give the 
highest penalty for the number of estimated parameters (Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong 
1992). The correction factor is -0.5*k* log N, where k is the difference in the number of 
parameters in Mf and Mg. The resulting normalized statistic is asymptotically normally 
distributed under the null hypothesis of equal fit. Given a critical value c from the stan-
dard normal distribution at some significance level, if the normalized LR statistic is 
smaller than c in absolute value, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and we 
conclude that the data do not enable us to discriminate between the two models; if the 
normalized LR statistic is smaller than –c, then we conclude that Mg is significantly 
better; and if it is greater than +c, then we conclude that Mf is significantly better. The 
estimation was conducted by using the iterative nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) method. The statistical tests based on the normalized LR statistics are given in 
Table 4 for each pair-wise comparison. Table 4 shows that model 1 provides a statisti-
cally worse fit than both model 2 and model 4. It also shows that model 4 is significantly 
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TABLE 4. Adjusted LR statistics for model selection 
 Mg 
Mf M2 M3 M4 
M1 -3.622951* -1.451088 -7.018934* 
M2  1.127174 -3.570608* 
M3   -2.053776* 
* Significant at the 5% level in a one-sided test and at the 10% level in a two-sided test. 
 
better than all other models, while model 1 and model 3, or model 2 and model 3 cannot 
discriminate against each other. Therefore, the conclusion from the Bayesian method that 
the CWB, the ABB, and the other exporting countries were in Cournot competition is 
supported by the generalized LR tests.3  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The lack of transparency in the pricing and operational activities of STEs has caused 
WTO members to express concern that certain countries’ STEs could circumvent Uruguay 
Round commitments on export subsidies, domestic support, or market access. Most previ-
ous studies have either examined single STE markets or evaluated an STE in isolation from 
other STEs. Furthermore, in most empirical work the important distinctions between 
homogeneous and differentiated goods are typically ignored. These are potentially very 
important issues because strategic trade policy is likely to be quite sensitive to specific 
market details. In this study, we examined a dual STE market structure of the differentiated 
world malting barley market in which two STEs (the CWB and ABB) maintained jointly a 
very large share of the export market. A conceptual two-stage model and an empirical 
framework were developed to evaluate the market structure and to examine possibilities of 
rent shifting. In addition, the model provides a framework to test if STEs set their initial 
payments at optimal levels within the context of their differentiated product. The theoreti-
cal model in the study proposed endogenous control of an upstream supply in that STEs 
chose the initial prices of their raw commodities given that they competed in a downstream 
market of imperfect substitutes. The decision sequence consisted of a precommitment stage 
in which STEs chose initial prices followed by an output stage that determined prices, 
quantities, and the trade flows for the two STEs and a group of other exporters.  
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Based on the conceptual model framework, data, and subsequent empirical results, 
important conclusions were reached. First, the STEs did not have market leadership in the 
differentiated global malting barley market. Both STEs and other exporting countries 
were in Cournot competition. Hamilton and Stiegert (2002) also found that the CWB was 
in Cournot competition with the other export sector in a homogeneous market. But unlike 
this study, they found support for rent-shifting and leadership outcomes for the STE. 
With product differentiation, firms rationally ignore rival behavior more than when 
products are the same, and we would naturally tend to observe the Cournot–Nash equilib-
rium in such cases.  
Second, both STEs were not setting their initial payments at optimal levels and did 
not shift rent from other exporting countries by utilizing a prepayment system as a 
precommitment. We found that both STEs set their initial payments higher than profit-
maximization levels, which may in part be attributable to a political constraint; that is, 
low initial payments are probably difficult to justify to producers. However, if the market 
is highly differentiated, then it may not make much sense to push this as a strategic policy 
tool compared to other practices such as price discrimination and developing long-term 
customer relations. In addition, the effect of rent shifting by lowering initial payments 
was not significant. In a product-differentiated environment, the realization of rent 
shifting depends not only on the presupposition of Cournot competition but also on the 
degree of product differentiation. In the world malting barley market, because of such 
things as product differentiation, geographic effects, and output shocks from weather 
conditions, the rent-shifting effects by using an initial payment as a precommitment 
mechanism were dampened. Therefore, there is no urgent need to impose disciplines on 
the prepayment system of STEs.  
  
End Notes 
1.  Other forms of rent-shifting are certainly possible, e.g., Fershtman and Judd (1987) 
demonstrate market rent shifting is possible through internal incentive systems.  
2.  In the preliminary analysis, a host of different MCMC chains with alternative 
starting values were used to check convergence of the parameter estimates. 
3.  To further test the robustness of the Bayesian results, an iterative nonlinear SUR 
estimation procedure was used on the five-equation model (equations [22]-[26]). 
Nonlinear SUR and the Bayesian results were similar in the sense that all market 
power parameters were insignificant, optimal initial payments were lower than ob-
served values, and rent-shifting effects were insignificant. However, they differ in 
magnitudes and significance of some parameter estimates (full details are available 
from the authors).  
 
  
Appendix 
Derivation of i
j
P
x
∂
∂  from the Inverse Demand Function 
From the inverse demand function, the price flexibilities are 
*
ij j ji
ij *
i j i
j
*
ij j 3i i i
ij ij ij*
ij i j j 3
cost         (i,j 1, 2).
cost
b x xPf
P x P
x
b x xP P PP b bPx P x x x
∂= = ∂
∂⇒ = = = = =∂
 
From homogeneity, 13 11 12f f f= − − :  
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3 1 3 3 3
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11 1 12 2
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                               ( )
cost cost
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xP P P Pf P f f f
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Similarly, 
* *2 2 2
23 23 21 22 12 1 22 2
3 3 3 3
cos( ) ( ) .P P P tP f f f b x b x
x x x x
∂= = = − − = − −∂  
Apply Young’s theorem to the normalized quadratic distance function,  
3 1
31 13
1 3
,P PP P
x x=
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂  
 
3 2
32 23
2 3
.P PP P
x x
∂ ∂= = =∂ ∂  
Since 
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we are able to derive P33 from f33: 
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Substituting Pij (i,j=1,2,3) into (17), (18), and (19), dividing both sides by cost, and 
combining xi with x3 into xi* yields (24), (25), and (26).  
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